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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

seeking it4 and that, without this assurance of confidentiality, patients
might repress violent thoughts with tragic consequences.4 5 However,
the dissent seems to have overlooked the most significant consideration involved-the lives of possible victims that may be saved by
the creation of a duty to warn.
The incidence of mental illness in North Dakota is not as widespread as in California. Nevertheless, the import of Tarasoff cannot
be completely overlooked by psychiatrists in North Dakota.
A question similar to the one posed in Tarasoff has been addressed by the federal courts in North Dakota. In Merchants National
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 46 a psychologist treating a dangerous mental patient at a veteran's hospital was held to be negligent in failing to bring evidence of the patient's mental condition
to the attention of the hospital personnel. 47 With such notice they
could have evaluated the evidence and presumably could have refused to allow the patient to leave, thus possibly preventing the murder that the patient committed shortly after his departure from the
hospital. While the court did not specifically rely upon a duty to warn
for its finding of liability, a fair reading of this decision does indicate
a possible basis for future rulings on this issue.
Violence is an ever-increasing and tragic consequence of mental
illness. Society has a right to demand protection from this violence
and the mentally ill have a concomitant right to psychotherapeutic
treatment. The therapist, however, is caught in the middle of this
struggle of rights. Since he is involved with potentially dangerous
individuals and is given the power to detain those suspected of being
dangerous,4 S the public may tend to perceive him as an agent of society whose duty is to protect society from the hidden danger confided
to him by his patients. The therapist is similarly seen as a confidant
by the patient in whom he can confide his deepest secrets. By imposing a duty to warn on the therapist only when the patient's confidences reveal a preventable danger to a third person, the California
Supreme Court has provided a fair and equitable solution to the therapist's dilemma.
KENT M. MORROW

DEFENDANT IS PREDISPOSED To
LAW-ENTRAPMENT-IF
COMMIT THE OFFENSE, No DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT EXISTS, EVEN
IF GOVERNMENT AGENT SUPPLIES THE CONTRABAND.
CRIMINAL

44.

Id.

at 459-60, 551 P.2d at 359-60, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39-40.

45. Id. at 459, 551 P.2d at 359, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39. See also In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d
415, 426, 467 P.2d 557, 564, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 836 (1970).
46. 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967).
47. Id. at 418.
48. N D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-08 (1970).
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Charles Hampton was convicted in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri for distribution of heroin.,
The heroin was allegedly 2 supplied to defendant by a paid government informer, and defendant subsequently sold the drug to the authorities pursuant to a plan arranged by the informant. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction,3 denying defendant's claim that the due process clause of the
fifth amendment forbid the conviction if the contraband had been
supplied by the government. 4 The United States Supreme Court af, 96 S. Ct. 1646
U.S.firmed.5 Hampton v. United States, (1976).
"Entrapment, as it is now recognized in the federal system, is
not a matter of statutory prescription, nor has it ever been. . .. "6
The origin of the entrapment doctrine7 and its current status derives from three opinions of the United States Supreme Court: Sorrells v.

United States," Sherman v.
10

States v. Russell.

United States,9

and

United

Although it is generally agreed that entrapment

1. Hampton's conviction was based upon a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (1972).
2. Although the facts concerning who had provided the heroin were disputed, the
court of appeals did consider defendant's "entrapment instruction" on the merits. The
requested instruction provided in part:
If you find that the defendant's sales of narcotics were sales of narcotics
supplied to him by an informer in the employ of or acting on behalf of the
government, then you must acquit the defendant because the law forbids his
conviction in such a case.
Hampton v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1646, 1648 (1976).
3. United States v. Hampton, 507 F.2d 832, 833 (1974). Judge Heaney dissented on
the grounds that entrapment should be established as a matter of law to a charge of possessing contraband, where such contraband was supplied by a government agent. Id. at
836-37.
4. In view of the Court's earlier holdings in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435
(1932), Sherman v. United, States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958), and United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423 (1973) defendant did not request a standard entrapment instruction, but instead
contended that the policy of the law forbade conviction. United States v. Hampton, 507
F.2d 832, 833 (8th Cir. 1974). The court of appeals rejected that argument, since it believed that Russell foreclosed it from considering any theory of entrapment founded on
something other than defendant's lack of predisposition, id. at 835, and since it was conceded by defendant's counsel that he was predisposed to commit the offense, he was
entitled to no'other entrapment instruction, id. at 836 & n.5.
5. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the plurality of the Court and was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice White. Justice Rehnquist also wrote for the majority in United
States v. Russell,. 411 U.S. 423 (1971), and was there jointed by Justices Burger, White,
Blackmun, and Powell. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion in Hampton in which
Justice Blackmun joined. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in Hampton in which
.Justices Stewart and Marshall joined. Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall had also
dissented in Russell, as did Justice Douglas, who retired in November 1975. Justice Douglas was replaced by Justice Stevens, who took no part in the consideration or decision
of Hlanmpton.
6. 1 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING
PAPERS, 303 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPERS].
7. It was not until 1915 that a federal court gave recognition to the entrapment doctrine. Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915). Although the United States
Supreme Court first applied the entrapment doctrine in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
it had earlier considered the entrapment defense in Grimm v. United States,
435 (1932),
156 U.S. 604 (1895), and Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928), but failed to find
government inducement in either case. For a study on the early developments of the docCourts: Emergence
trine of entrapment, see 'Murchison, The Entrapment Defense in Federal
of aI Legal Doctrine, 47 Miss. L.J. 211 (1976).
8. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
9. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
10. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
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includes the "planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it
except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer. . . .- 11 the
majority and minority 2 opinions of the three leading cases have disagreed on whether the defendant must be an "innocent" person or
whether his predisposition to commit the crime is immaterial in
view of the police conduct in question.
In Sorrells v. United States,"1 defendant was convicted for
possessing and selling liquor during Prohibition. 14 A government informer had made repeated attempts upon defendant to procure liquor,
"taking advantage of the sentiment aroused by reminiscences of their
experiences as companions in arms in the World War. '15 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding "that defendant had no
previous disposition to commit it but was an industrious, law-abiding
"16 The Court thus focused
citizen . . . otherwise innocent ....
on the character of the particular defendant and established what
has become generally known as the subjective test. 7 The Court in
Sorrells found the entrapment defense to be based on an "implied
exception" in the statute, stating: "[T]he question is whether the
defense . . . takes the case out of the purview of the statutebecause it cannot be supposed that the Congress intended that the letter of its enactment should be used to support such a gross perversion of its purpose."' 18 Thus, an entrapped person not being covered
by the statute, was not guilty of the crime in question, and his entrapment defense was raised by a not-guilty plea. 19 Furthermore,
under this approach, the defendant's past criminal record becomes
important since the jury is to assess the defendant's pre-disposition
20
to commit the crime.
Justice Roberts, concurring in the result in Sorrells, advanced
11.

Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932)

(Roberts, J., concurring).

12. The minority approach was first articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells. Id. at
453-59. It was endorsed by Justice Frankfurter's concurring cpinion in Sherman v. United

States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958)

and Justice Stewart's dissent in United States v. Russell, 411

U.S. 423 (1973).

13. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
14. Id. at 438-39.
15. Id. at 441.
16.

Id.

17.

In differentiating the subjective and objective tests it has been said that:

The words 'subjective' and 'objective' are commonly used labels for the two
standard formulations of the entrapment doctrine. The words are meant to
refer to the circumstance that the 'objective' approach considers whether
the conduct of police agents would have tempted a hypothetical person, while
the 'subjective' anproach considers whether the defendant himself was led
astray by the government's conduct.
Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. Rgv. 163, 165n.2 (1976).
18. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932).
19. Id.
20. The Court stated:

[I]f the defendant seeks acquittal

by reason of entrapment he cannot

complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and
predisposition as bearing upon that issue.

Id. at 451.
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what has become generally known as the objective test of entrap22
and
ment.2 1 The objective approach emphasizes police conduct
"[tihe applicable principle is that courts must be closed to the

trial of a crime instigated by the government's own agents.

12 3

Jus-

tice Roberts felt that the entrapment defense was not based upon

an implied exception to the statute, 24 but "rather on a fundamental

rule of public policy."' 25 Under this approach, the entrapment defense is raised by a motion to dismiss and the court, rather than

of the propriety of the law enforcethe jury, decides the question
26
ment agents' behavior.
The majority approach was affirmed in Sherman v. United
States.2 7 The court reasoned that to adopt the objective approach
espoused by Justice Roberts would "entail both overruling a leading
decision [Sorrells] of this court and brushing aside the possibility
that we would be creating more problems than we would supposedly
28
be solving."
Due to the holdings in Sorrells and Sherman, the distinction between the majority and minority views seemed to be largely of academic interest.2 9 The Court, however, reconsidered the theory of
21.
22.

1M. at 459. Justice Roberts was also joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone.
Under the objective approach, the question is asked:
[W]as that conduct, objectively considered, such that it involved a substantial risk of inducing persons to engage in forbidden conduct who would
not ordinarily engage in that sort of conduct?

W. LAFAVE & A. Sco'r,

CRIMINAL LAW

371 (1972).

23. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 459 (1932).
24. Justice Roberts stated:
This amounts to saying that one who with full intent commits the act
defined by law as an offense is nevertheless by virtue of the unspoken and
implied' mandate nf the statute to be adjudged not guilty by reason of someone's else [sic] improper conduct.
Id. at 456.
25. Id. at 457. Justice Frankfurter concurring in Sherman v. United States, 856 U.S.
369 (1958), stated:
The courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not because his conduct
falls outside the proscription of the statute, but because, even if his guilt be
admitted, the methods employed on behalf of the government to bring about
the conviction cannot be countenanced.
Id. at 380.
26. "It is the province of the court and of the court alone to protect itself and the
government from such prostitution of the criminal law." Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 457 (1932).
27. 356 U.S. 369 (1958). The facts in Sorrells and Sherman were very similar. In Sherman, defendant was convicted for selling. narcotics to a government informer. While derefendant and informer were both being treated for narcotics addiction, the informer
to treatpeatedly asked defendant to supply him with drugs as he was not responding pleadings
ment. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction emphasizing the continuous
to the use of
by the informant and the fact that defendant had been "induced" to return
narcotics. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373, 376 (1958).
28. Id. at 377-78.
opinions
29. In both Sorrells and Sherman, the minority view was set forth in concurring felt that
in Sherman,
that entrapment had been proved. Justice Frankfurter, concurring
Justice Robert's approach should be adopted or at least considered by the majority. its
The fact that since the Sorrells case the lower courts have either ignored or
case,
theory and continued to rest decisions on the narrow facts of each
. ••
have failed after penetrating effort to define a satisfactory generalization
deemed
be
to
is proof that the prevailing theory of the Sorrells case ought not
the last word.
to the controversy Involved, this
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 379 (1958). Due

288
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entrapment in United States v. Russell3 ° on the contention that the
entrapment defense should rest on constitutional grounds.
In Russell, defendant was convicted 'of the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine, more commonly called "speed". 31 A
government undercover agent had provided defendant with an essential ingredient 32 in the manufacture of the drug. Defendant contended that the Court should adopt a rigid constitutional rule, 33 "that
would preclude any prosecution when it is shown that the criminal
conduct would not have been possible had not an undercover agent
'supplied an indispensable means to the commission of the crime
that could not have been obtained otherwise, through legal or illegal
channels.' -34 The Court declined to adopt such a rule, emphasizing
that the ingredient provided to defendant was legal and that defendant had continued making the drug after the ingredient had
been depleted. 35 However, the Court added this caveat: "[Wie may
some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law
enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would
from invoking judicial processes to
absolutely bar the government
3 6
obtain a cinviction.
Thus, the "predisposition" approach apparently controlled in Russell, since defendant did not fit within his own proposed rule. The
Court left open for a case by case adjudication the question of what
types of law enforcement conduct might be sufficiently outrageous
to bar prosecutionn, 3 7 and several courts responded to this cue.38
In United States v. Bueno,3 9 the Fifth Circuit found entrapment
area of the law has sparked a wealth of material on the subject. The overwhelming majority of commentators have favored the minority approach. See Park, slipra note 17, at
167n.13. The fact that scholarly opinion favors the objective test is reflected in United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). In Russell the majority opinion relied solely upon

case -law, id. at 428-36, whereas the dissenting opinion claimed the support of a majority
of commentators, id. at 445n.3.
30.
31.
32.

411 U.S. 423 (1973).
Id. at 424.
Id. at 426. Although

the

ingredient

was

legally

obtainable,

it

was

very

difficult

to obtain.
33. Defendant conceded that he may have harbored a predisposition to commit the
offense, but contended that the government was so involved in the manufacture of the drug
that a criminal prosecution violated the fundamental principles of due process. Id. at 430.
34. Id. at 431.

35. Id. at 431-32.
36. Id.
37. See Peitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 5, United States v. Hanmpton, 96 S. Ct. 1646
(1976).

38.

See, e.g., United States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974) ; Greene v. United

States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) ; United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971) ;
United States v. Dillett, 254 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ; State v. Bocelli, 105 Ariz. 405,
, 181 S.E.2d 754 (1971).
N.C. App.467 P.2d 740 (1970) ; State v. Powell, On the basis of these cases defendant in Hampton argued:
has
been a growing body of
to
Russell,
there
[B]oth prior and subsequent
authority that universally condemned one particular law enforcement pracof supnlying the very contraband to the defendant that was the
tice-that
subject of the offense with which he was charged.

Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 5, United States v. Hampton, 96 S. Ct. 1646 (1976).
39.

447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971).
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as a matter of law, regardless of predisposition, when a government
informer furnished the drugs to defendant for sale to a government
agent. 40 The Third Circuit agreed and followed the Fifth Circuit ap41
proach in United States v. West.
However, most circuit courts of appeal that have considered the
matter have concluded that the mere supplying of contraband does
not constitute entrapment or otherwise bar the defendant's prosecu42
tion.
The Eighth Circuit chose this latter approach in Hampton v. United States43 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari"4 to resolve
the conflict among the circuits. The Court, in affirming the appellate
court's opinion, appeared to enunicate a per se rule:" 5 "[In Russell]
[wle ruled out the possibility that the defense of entrapment could
ever be based upon governmental misconduct in a case, such as this
one, where the predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime
was established. '46 The Court further held: "The remedy of the criminal defendant with respect to the acts of government agents, which
. . . are encouraged by him, lies solely in the defense of entrapment. ' ' 47 The Court rejected defendant's argument involving a violation of his due process rights, finding that defendant's case differed
from Russell only in degree, not in kind.4" Although the government
played a more significant role in Hampton by supplying the contraband, rather than just a legal ingredient as in Russell, defendant
conceded that he was predisposed to commit the crime for which
he was convicted, and this was found to render the defense of en4 9
trapment unavailable to him.
Justice Brennan, in dissent, found that Hampton was distinguishable from Russell on two grounds: The chemical supplied in Russell
was not contraband, and the defendant in Russell was an active participant in the enterprise both before and after the government agent
appeared on the scene.5 0 Justice Brennan felt that entrapment under
the subjective approach was only one possible defense 1 and would
40.

The Fifth Circuit held that where the government

had provided the contraband',

there was entrapment as a matter of law. Id. at 905-06. The Fifth Circuit has also held
that Bueno was unaffected by Russell. See, e.g., United States v. Mosely, 496 F.2d 1012

(5th Cir. 1974) ; United States v. Oquendo, 490 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974).
41.

511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975).

43.
44.

507 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1974).
420 U.S. 1003 (1975).

42. See, e.g., United States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v.
McGrath, 494 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1974) ; United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.
1973) ; United States v. Johnson. 484 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1973).
45. Although concurring In the result, Justice Powell felt that Russell controlled and
there was no need to enunciate such a rule. Hampton v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1646.
1650

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

(1976).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1649 (emphasis added).
(emphasis added).
at 1653.
at 1654. Justice Brennan agreed with the suggestion in Justice

Powell's con-
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have held that "conviction is barred as a matter of law where the
subject of the criminal charge is the sale of contraband provided
' 52
to the defendant by a Government agent.
The test of entrapment in North Dakota is the objective or minority approach. The North Dakota statute5 3 provides:
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement agent induces
the commission of an offense, using persuasion or other
means likely to cause normally law-abiding persons to commit the offense. Conduct. merely affording a person an oppor54
tunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment
Thus, in North Dakota "[t]he question is not whether the agent's
behavior actually caused the specific individual to commit the offense but whether such behavior would be likely to cause a 'normally law abiding person' to commit it."" The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws has stated that under the
objective approach to entrapment, "[tlhe defense is treated primarily as a curb upon improper law enforcement techniques, to
to which the predisposition of the particular defendant is irrelevant."58
The plurality's holding in Hampton appears to extend the line
of entrapment decisions to the following proposition: "[T]he concept of fundamental fairness inherent in the guarantee of due process would never prevent the conviction of a predisposed defendant,
regardless of the outrageousness of police behavior in light of the
surrounding circumstances. " 5 7 Although the plurality reasoned that
Hampton was governed by the Russell decision, their opinion extended permissible police behavior beyond the boundaries of Russell.
Russell was based on a limited fact situation and was further clouded by the Court's caveat concerning due process.
The plurality
in Hampton re-affirmed the "pre-disposition" approach and, in so
doing, overturned a substantial number of federal decisions.5 9
curring opinion that, where police conduct is outrageous, a ,lftndant
can either argue that
there was a violaton of due process or appeal to thQ Court's supervisory power to bar

the conviction. Id. at 1651.
52. Id.
at 1654. This is the Fifth Circuit approach, which was announced in United
States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971).
53. N.D. CENT. ConE § 12.1-05-11 (1976). The new criminal code became effective on

July 1, 1975. Although the old code did not statutorily authorize entrapment, there is a
North Dakota Supreme Court decision that has recognized it. State v. Currie, 13 N.D. 655,
102 N.W. 875 (1905).
54. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11(2) (1976).
55. A Hornbook to the North Dakota Criminal Code, 50 N.D.L. REV. 639, 680-81 quoting
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11(2) (1976).
56. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL RE-

PORT, § 702 Comment (1971).
57. Hampton v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1646,
(emphasis added).

58.
59.

See text accompanying note 36 supra.
See text accompanying notes 38-42 supra.

1651

(1976),

(Powell,

J.

concurring)
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The effect of the decision in Hampton may be to hasten legislatures 0 into adopting entrapment statutes.61 The advantage of an
entrapment statute is that it "can organize and define the subject
of all entrapment without regard to the specific factual circumstances
that often restrict the generality of a judicial opinion."e2
The controversy concerning entrapment which began with the
Court's opinion in Sorrells is still prevelant today. Although it is generally agreed that "criminal activity is such that stealth and strat3
egy are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer,'6
there is still dispute as to when stealth and strategy become the
"manufacturing of crime.

'6 4
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CONSTITUTIONAL
UNANNOUNCED,

LAW-SEARCH
BREAKING

AND

AND

SEIZURE-COURT

ENTERING

TO INSTALL

AUTHORIZED,
ELECTRONIC

SURVEILLANCE DEVICE FOUND TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL.

Pursuant to court authorization, 1 federal officers made an unannounced forcible intrusion into Salvatore Agrusa's place of business, 2 while it was vacant and closed to the public. The federal officers entered for the purpose of installing an electronic surveillance
device. Upon termination of the court authorized surveillance,3 the
officers again forcibly entered the vacant premises, this time to remove the device. The evidence secured in this fashion was subsequently admitted at trial and aided in Agrusa's conviction for violation of the federal firearms statute. 4 On appeal, Agrusa contended
that "since the
60. The Court noted in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973)
defense is not of a constitutional dimension, Congress may address itself to the question
and adopt any substantive definition of the defense that it may find desirable." Id. at 433.
61. Despite support from the commentators, only a few states have adopted the minority
approach. See Park, supra note 17, at 167n.3.
62.
,VORKING PAPERS, supra note 6, at 304.
63. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
64. Id.
electronic
surto
conduct
for
authorization
application
government's
1. The
veillance was submitted to the Honorable Elno B. Hunter, United States District Judge
for the Western District of Missouri on February 28, 1974.
2. Agrusa operated an auto body shop in Independence, Missouri.
3. The authorization was issued by Judge Hunter the same day as applied for, February 28, 1974. The authorization was issued pursuant to Title III of the Onmibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1971).
(1971), dealing in firearms without a license, however, is not
4. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1)
one of the offenses for which the court may authorize electronic interception of oral
communications under 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1971). The application for authorization to conduct electronic surveillance was made stating that probable cause existed that Agrusa
Was, in fact, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 659, 2315, and 371 (1971) for which 18 U.S.C. § 2516
authorized the admission of evidence obtained through court authorized electronic
(1971)
surveillance. The government obtained a supplemental order, required under 1S U.S.C. §
2517 (1971), which authorized the use of the intercepted communications before the grand

